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ABSTRACT
The need for multilevel secure (MLS) systems still exists yet, the popularity of desktop systems has
resulted in the imposition of new requirements. To be useful, a system must employ commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) operating systems and office productivity software. We describe the
preliminary architecture for a COTS-driven local area network that will provide MLS services to
users while permitting them to employ standard office productivity tools on standard
workstations. Our ongoing development centers on the provision of multilevel mail and
messaging to the desktop.
1.  Introduction
The problem of timely access to information at
multiple security levels has challenged the
computer security research and engineering
community for several decades. During the 1960s
and 1970s attention was focussed on the
development of high assurance security kernels by
vendors. The resulting systems permit controlled
sharing of sensitive information by users at
multiple security levels. Often these reference
validation mechanisms present primitive interfaces
upon which the service-rich interfaces demanded
by users and modern applications must be built.
By the early 1980s researchers had turned their
attention to the support of complex applications in
the context of multilevel systems. Challenges
included allowing users to view multiple security
levels simultaneously, while minimizing, if not
completely avoiding, modifications to underlying
security kernels used to enforce mandatory
security policies. Considerable success in
demonstrating that complex functionality can be
provided outside of the reference validation
mechanism was obtained by several projects
including both database systems, e.g. [11], and
modern file systems, e.g. [9]. In most cases, these
results applied to custom-built systems.  This
precluded their rapid evolution and update as
vendors developed new, more capable
applications.
Personal computers and workstations have become
increasingly important tools of office automation
and productivity during the last decade. The use of
commodity software exploded and automated
information technology was no longer the
province of scientists and engineers, but of the
entire work force. When connected to local area
networks (LANs), these desktop systems can be
supported by centralized hosts providing a wide
variety of services such as mail, networking,
accounting, engineering applications, etc. DoD is
making enormous in commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) software and commodity PC products.
This shift to COTS has lead to new requirements:
the ability to incorporate patches and updates to
existing COTS products and the ability to enlarge
the desktop-based software suite as new products
become available. Unfortunately, multilevel
security has been left in the wake of these changes.
Today, the problem for DoD systems includes not
only the provision of control of access to and
movement of data based on fixed sensitivity
levels, but the preservation of compatibility with
COTS application software as well. When security
is paramount, it has been achieved at the price of
compatibility. In contrast, when compatibility with
COTS applications takes precedence, then instead
of employing trusted systems for timely sharing of
information, each access class is relegated to a
separate information system. Independent system-
high enclaves are established and sharing is
achieved through: manual, "sneaker-net"
techniques; automated guards for which no notion
of sufficiency or completeness with respect to
security policy enforcement can be demonstrated;
or replication systems [8]. If the number of access
classes to be supported is high, t en the use of
physical separation becomes cumbersome, costly,
and inflexible in terms of both equipment and
administration.
 A solution is the implementation of a COTS-
driven LAN supporting a family of high assurance
trusted servers [1]. Through the use of existing
evaluated high assurance components, it is
possible to develop a security architecture that
supports a fully functional multilevel secure
environment for workstations with a high level of
security for information. A major advantage of this
architecture is that it is intended to provide
compatibility with COTS PC or workstation
operating systems and applications. Several factors
contribute to the feasibility of our effort:
§ The use of "diskless", rather than multilevel,
workstations   eliminates the need to develop
true multilevel workstations   enforcing
mandatory security policy. Here "diskless"
means that   volatile storage at the workstation
may be purged under trusted computing base
(TCB) control;   workstations may include
non-volatile, read-only disks.
§ The use of "Wintel" workstations making the
LAN attractive to end users, who will be able
to continue to use their favorite applications,
but within the context of a high assurance
multilevel environment.
§ Use of an evaluated, commercially available,
high assurance TCB reduces both risk and
cost, while leveraging already significant DoD
investments in high assurance products.
Here we will describe an ongoing effort to develop
components for a high assurance multilevel secure
local area network constructed using evaluated
products as well as commercial-off-the-shelf
workstations and office productivity software.
To demonstrate the feasibility of a family of
multilevel secure servers, we have chosen to focus
on a mail service. Ongoing academic research in
the area of mail server user- and transport-agents
permits us access to existing source code as a basis
for the server application. Ultimately, we envision
a variety of applications supported by one or more
high assurance servers.
 The prototype system being built consists of the
following components: a trusted mail server based
on a adaptation of a free mail software to a high
assurance TCB; a Wintel-based COTS workstation
and/or a thin, etwork computer client; a TCB
extension at the client to provide a trusted path;
and components to provide secure
communications between the workstation and the
trusted mail server. Users accessing the system at
the client will be able to execute unmodified
COTS mail interfaces. Once the TCB has been
a hi ved on the LAN, it will be possible to
enhance the high assurance server to support high
assurance label-based selection of encryption for
messaging services. This trusted communications
service (TCS) can provide high assurance that the
correct cryptography is applied to sensitive data
planned for the exportation of mail beyond the
server.
The organization of this paper is as follows.
Overall system requirements are presented in
Section 2. Section 3 will provide a description of
the overall architecture including the high
assurance base, the mail server application, the
client workstations, and the TCB extension. We
will provide a comparison of our architecture with
a few other approaches in Section 4. In Section 5
we will outline continuing work on this effort and
possible future extensions. A summary in Section
6 will complete this paper.
2.  System Requirements
Her  we present high-level system requirements.
They fall into two categories: functional
requirements and non-functional requirements.
Functional Requirements for the server are:
§ COTS Clients: The server should support a
COTS PC client that has been enhanced with a
TCB extension. COTS operating system
software should be unmodified,
§ COTS Application Independence: The server
environment must support unmodified COTS
mail client software,
§ Client Extensibility: The server should
identify an engineering path for introducing
TCB extensions to additional client platforms,
and
§ Server Application Extensibility: An
engineering path for extending the server to
support additional server-based applications
should be identified.
Non-Functional requirements driving our system
architecture include: Multilevel Security,
Discretionary Access Control, Cost,
Authentication, Audit Support, Reliability, and
Performance.
3.  Preliminary System Architecture
This section is intended to provide a top-level
description of the trusted server architecture. The
architecture consists of two major elements: the
LAN and the non-local messaging support. We
sketch both here, but will provide detailed
discussion only of the LAN, the principle focus of
our current efforts. We are using a mail server as
our prototype application.
The goal of the trusted server development is to
utilize a LAN with a trusted server and
workstations to provide a secure mail processing
environment in which user functions or programs
can be securely integrated at virtually any time
while still preserving the security of existing data.
This will be achieved by defining secure operation
in terms of allowed accesses.
The overall system architecture, shown in Figure1,
consists of the following components:
§ A high assurance mail server composed of
untrusted mail server instances constrained by
a high assurance TCB, that will ensure
enforcement of critical security policy at the
server.
§ Untrusted COTS client mail applications that
will issue requests to the server. A security
level will be associated with each client
instance and a server instance at an identical
security level will handle the client's request.
The high assurance TCB will permit server
instances to respond to requests for
information at or below the security level of
the instance.
§ A messaging server will insure the proper
labeling of information leaving and entering
the system. Label-based encryption can be
selected to ensure the protection of
information transiting unprotected networks.
§ Clients may communicate with the server
from protected system high enclaves, across
the multilevel LAN, or across unprotected
networks. For each of these cases, the session
level of the clients will be determined.
§ The security level of a protected, system
high enclave connected directly to the
server will be statically defined when the
system is configured.
§ Each LAN client will be fitted with a TCB
extension that will provide high assurance
services for object reuse, a trusted path to
the high assurance server, and support for
client-server session cryptography. LAN
clients will be "diskless" workstations or
network computers.
§ Across unprotected networks, sensitivity
labels will be bound to the transmitted
information. Network encryption will be
used to protect communications.
3.1. Security Policy Enforcement
In our architecture, all mandatory access control
policy enforcement is delegated to the high
assurance TCB used as the underlying server
platform. The high assurance base has been chosen
so that it enforces mandatory policy using a label-
based mechanism that maps to a lattice [5]. Since
all mandatory policies can be expressed as a
lattice, a label-based enforcement mechanism can
be used in all cases. The initial implementation of
the system will enforce a DoD secrecy and/or
integrity policy as formally stated in the Bell and
LaPadula [2] and a Biba  [3] models, respectively.
Although it is not envisioned that the TCB will
enforce a variety of mandatory security policies
simultaneously, it is desirable that the TCB be
adaptable. Thus through modifications to its non-
discretionary security policy enforcement module,
alternative mandatory policies can be enforced,
such as commercial secrecy or integrity policies in
which information can be separated into either
hierarchical and/or non-hierarchical equivalence
classes [10] or mandatory role-based policies. This
would enhance prospects for commercialization of
the server effort.
Figure 1. High Assurance Trusted Server Architecture
Enforcement of mandatory policy is allocated to
the high assurance server. In addition to relying on
the high assurance TCB to enforce mandatory
confidentiality policy, its effectiveness as an
integrity enforcement mechanism is also being
explored. Two forms of integrity will be
investigated: data integrity [3] and program
integrity [14].
Since the mail server applications under
consideration do not enforce discretionary security
policies, there is no need to layer discretionary
policy enforcement mechanisms using TCB
subsets [15]: we depend entirely upon the
discretionary mechanism provided by the
underlying high assurance base. We note,
however, that our architecture would not preclude
the use of TCB subsets and balanced assurance.
Beyond the problem of mandatory policy
enforcement, there are many factors that affect
server security. Each service application has a
unique set of security issues. Those associated
with the configuration of the application are
beyond the scope of this investigation. Others
relate to the software engineering rigor applied to
the application during its creation. Some mail
programs are notoriously fragile and we are
exploring the most effective techniques to leverage
the high assurance TCB protection mechanisms to
mitigate some of these vulnerabilities.
3.2. Trusted Mail Server
The Trusted Mail Server will consist of a high
ass rance TCB and untrusted mail server instances
















security policy. The advantages of this approach
are that the server will support sharing and
labeling and will be functionally equivalent in
terms of application-level protocol support to an
existing popular package. This provides
compatibility with existing COTS software.
3.2.1. High Assurance Base
The choice of the high assurance base for the
design, adaptation, and implementation of the
server and associated multilevel secure
communication services is of critical importance
to the favorable outcome of this effort.
It is defined by the broad properties needed for a
viable commercial product. Our definition of a
high assurance base is a TCB that is already on the
Evaluated Products List (EPL) with a Class B3 or
higher digraph based upon an evaluation against
the TCSEC [12] or the TNI. We considered
ONLY products on the EPL. We have selected the
most recent model of the Wang XTS-300. Both
business and technical considerations affected our
deliberations.
The principal non-technical consideration was the
availability of software and hardware maintenance
support to insure that the systems could be held in
an evaluated configuration.
The principal technical consideration was the
ability of the high assurance base to enforce
security policy. The high assurance TCB, by virtue
of the protection domains it creates, provides
confidence that any possible malicious code will
neither cause the exfiltration of sensitive data nor
the corruption of high integrity information. Other
factors included ease of use, available software
tools, and interfaces.
3.2.2. Mail Service Application
If the mail service application is instantiated
within single level subjects at several access
classes, the result is a multilevel mail server
supporting controlled sharing of individual files.
Of course, we must modify the application to view
files dominated by the subject's access class. The
user view of the system is of mailboxes at or
below the user's current session level. Our
intention is to analyze the application structure
required for a mail server consisting of single level
instances intended to manage a multilevel
structure of mail resources. Based on this analysis
a preliminary free-ware mail program can be
adapted to the multilevel environment. Users will
log o  to the server, establishing an identity for
audit and access control purposes. The mail server
will be the locus of several other capabilities
including security logging and audit, as well as
secure downgrading and connection services.
The problem of adapting an existing server to the
high assurance base can be divided into two sets of
issu s: those concerned with moving the server
software to any new platform, and those
specifically concerned with targeting it to a high
assurance platform. While these issues are
interdependent, they are discussed separately
below.
Earlier work on application partitioning for high
ssurance platforms, e.g., [9][11] is being
leveraged. One approach to separating information
at different security classes would be to utilize
existing server software that permits flexible
un erlying information storage while presenting a
unified view to users. Software able to support
multiple "root" directories would be particularly
well suited to this approach.
In our approach [6], both the mail spool and the
mail boxes of individual users will be stored at the
high assurance server. We take advantage of the
existing file system provided by the XTS-300. In a
series of experiments using the free-ware lm user-
agent software, we explored several issues related
to the management of mail on the high assurance
platform.
Mov ment of mail to the server mail spools
We anticipate two methods to move incoming
mail to mail spools. First, if the external
connection is single level, then all incoming mail
at that connection will be implicitly labeled with
he access class of the connection. An untrusted
subject executing at the access class of the
connection can move mail into the spool.
If a multilevel connection is made for incoming
mail, then a trusted subject will be required. It
must be able to read and write at a range of
security levels. Its task is to examine the security
label on incoming mail and place it in a mail spool
at the correct security level. To minimize the
complexity of the trusted subject, mail spool
daemons at each security level instantiated in the
system can read mail from buffers used by the
multilevel subject. The use of a trusted subject to
sort mail by access class is justified in that it is not
complex and satisfies the definition of a "classic"
security guard [4].
Mail spool to individual in-boxes movement
The movement of mail from the spool to an
individual's in-box is usually invoked by a get-
mail command issued by the client or user agent.
If the client is running at a high security level, then
the user should be able to see new mail at all
access classes dominated by the session level.
How can mail be moved to the in-boxes without
involving a complex trusted subject? We have
chosen to implement mail daemons that move mail
from the mail spools at each access class to user
mailboxes at each access class. Our approach
differs from typical mail movement systems, in
which users invoke some get-mail command, but
we believe that we are justified since all mail
remains stored at the high assurance server.
 Mail daemons that move messages from the mail
spool to mailboxes at each access class eliminate
the requirement for a get-mail trusted subject.
Because mail will be stored in the mailboxes at the
high assurance server, mail will not be moved to
an inappropriate client, so there is no requirement
to leave the mail on the spool. For users who
desire more control, get-mail can be invoked at
individual session levels.  The possibility of per
user configurations of these services will be
explored.
Marking and deleting mail within mail folders
Typically, as a user reads mail, the following
things can occur:
§ The mail is marked as read,
§ The mail is moved to an alternate mail folder,
e.g., if a user is storing mail from a
correspondent named Bill, then it may be
moved from the general in-box to a folder
called mail-from-bill.
§ Unwanted mail is deleted.
How will this take place in a multilevel
environment?
First, we have made a high-level decision that mail
will be moved to other mail folders only when the
user's session level matches that of the folders.
What about marking or deleting mail? If the
s ssion level is HIGH, then marking or deleting
mail a  lower access classes requires a disallowed
write down. To avoid this, there are two
alternatives. First, users can be forced to read and
mark mail at each security level. This is a choice
that will minimize the compromise of sensitive
information. It is also a choice that could result in
significant user frustration as mail would have to
be reprocessed at each sensitivity level.
An alternative is to have the server create lists
intended for downgrading to lower security levels.
These will contain identifiers for the mail to be
marked as read and or deleted. Each list can be
downgraded by a trusted subject invoked by the
user. Untrusted mail subjects can interpret the lists
at each access class, and automatically mark and
delete mail appropriately.
Substantial effort is still required to support a
complete mail system including: continued
exploration of user-agent issues and the
implementation of transport-agent functions.
3.3. Client Workstations
COTS workstations are being fitted with a TCB
extension that is intended to provide three
security-relevant functions: establish a trusted path
between the user and the TCB, enforce the object
reuse provision of the extended TCB, and enforce
data movement and access controls based on a
system of labels indicating the user's authorization
and data sensitivity.
 To insure that object reuse requirements [12] are
met, workstations will be "diskless," with
sufficient RAM-disk capability to support a wide
variety of user applications. The workstation TCB
extension will satisfy object reuse requirements by
ensuring that RAM and other volatile primary and
secondary storage at the workstation are purged
with each change of session level or new user
login at the workstation.
Each user will be able to manipulate data from the
server in COTS applications (e.g. Word Perfect,
Lotus 1-2-3, etc.) at his/her authorized security
level. Any data dominated by a user's session level
can be read from the server. Writes to the server
will be at the current session level.
As constrained by the security policy enforced by
the mandatory component of the high assurance
TCB, any data dominated by a user's session level
can be read from the server. Writes to the server
will be at the current session level. The number of
levels supported will be a configurable function of
the underlying TCB supporting the server.
The use of "diskless" workstations logically leads
to a recent commercial development: the network
computer.
3.3.1. Network Computers: The Ultimate
Diskless Clients
The use of network computers is an attractive
advanced option for our architecture. These
devices, proposed in 1996 by Larry Ellison, of
Oracle, Inc., take advantage of the World Wide
Web or a corporate Intranet. Java is envisioned as
the initial language to support network computer
applications. Although these devices have yet to
achieve widespread popularity, they offer several
advantages for many DoD environments:
Reduced cost
It has been estimated that although the hardware
cost for a typical PC for office automation is on
the order of $2000, the cost of installing and
maintaining software on these devices is on the
order of $7000 annually. The network computer is
intended to reduce those costs dramatically by
allowing users to download executable content
from a centralized server.
Centralized control of software updates
This will permit much more effective
configuration management in a distributed
computing environment. The complexity of
making the transition between software versions
can be simplified. Centralization will allow new
applications to be introduced more easily.
Reduced Employee Distraction
Centralized services can be used to limit the
number and types of applications available to
employees during working hours. Game playing
and other distractions can be reduced. Employees
will be better able to focus on their jobs.
Smartcard Interfaces
Smartcard technology is being incorporated into
network computers to personalize them for the
user and to provide security functionality such as
authentication support for communication with the
server. It is interesting to note that industrial
alliances are already being forged to incorporate
smartcard technology into network computers
[13]. Without sufficient security engineering, the
smart cards will be a bypassable mechanism [6]
which would render them inadequate for use with
sensitive information. The incorporation of the
smartcard interface into the TCB extension could
insure a high assurance trusted path between the
client and server.
These innovations are likely to be pursued by
DoD, however without sufficient security design
and engineering, there is a significant risk that
sensitive information will be compromised or that
untrustworthy applications will result in malicious
executions at clients.
3.3.2. TCB Extension
What requirements must be imposed on a
workstation in order to use it in our architecture?
For a monolithic system, the device employed for
user interaction with high assurance systems can
be a dumb terminal. All processing of information
is isolated within the high assurance system. In our
architecture, information will be passed from the
high assurance server to a fully functional PC.
Unless the PC is constrained, there are many
opportunities for the exfiltration of sensitive
information.
We intend to treat PC-based workstations as if
they were "diskless" network computers.  Each
COTS workstation will be adapted to contain a
TCB extension providing the following security-
relevant functions:
Secure boot of workstation
The TCB extension must insure that it has initial
control of the client and its resources at the time of
boot and that control over   security critical actions
s maintained throughout the client   session.
User-to-TCB trusted path
The TCB extension must provide a trusted path
between the high assurance workstation and the
client for the purposes of identification and
authentication as well as session level negotiation.
It must be established as part of start-up and
invocation using a secure attention key must be
avail ble at all times. To achieve the trusted path,
there must be a protocol between the workstation
TCB-extension and the trusted server TCB so that
the server TCB can unambiguously establish that
it is communicating with the workstation TCB.
Ultimately, use of cryptographic techniques to
embed a "secure attention key" in the data stream,
which is scanned by the server TCB that identifies
it as a request for the trusted path provides TCB-
to-TCB communications with high confidence.
Limited resources may require that our prototype
demonstration use an interim alternative for the
trusted path: enforcement of a low layer protocol
to uniquely mark TCB-to-TCB communication.
Enforce object reuse at the "extended" TCB
The TCB extension must insure that requirements
for object reuse are met. This will be achieved by
purging all volatile primary and secondary storage
when users negotiate a new session level.
Session-based cryptography on the LAN
Although control over security critical actions
have been identified, control over I/O on the LAN,
because of its importance, is specifically identified
as a responsibility of the TCB extension.
The TCB extension is based on a programmable
controller card. The architecture of the workstation
TCB extension is intended to maximize
compatibility with COTS products. We are
building on work already completed on products
for workstation control by using the
MESA/MEMS products [15]. These are being
adapted to provide the TCB services required for
this effort. Our project currently has two
MESA/MEMS controller boards operating in PCs
running DOS Windows 3.1. This permits us to
build upon an existing engineering effort rather
than pursuing, at greater risk, the development of a
simple TCB extension especially for this effort.
The development of a intermediate software-based
design prototype on a Wintel-based PC will permit
initial examination of design choices. Use of an
add-on card that is self-contained and requires no
modification to the workstation in order to
function materially reduces both effort and risk.
4.  Comparison with Other
Approaches
In this section we will describe other approaches
to achieving high assurance multilevel security for
practical network architectures. Recall that our
objective is to permit any authorized user to be
able to login onto a workstation with a selected
session level and be able to access all information
dominated by that session level.
4.1. High Assurance at the Workstation
An architecture we rejected was one in which the
user negotiates a session level at the workstation
and then connects to a host at the negotiated level.
Such a system has several drawbacks.
First, the user will have to toggle back and forth
between security levels in order to access
information at the different levels. The problem
here i  that the toggling must be invoked not only
for write access to information at differing security
levels, but for read access as well.
Second, the user will not be able to view
information at multiple security levels
simultaneously unless information at multiple
security levels is stored at the workstation.
Clearly, an architecture of this type will be
vulnerable to Trojan Horse attacks unless the
workstation is itself trusted. Let us explore for a
moment why this is so: Suppose that the user sets
the session level to SECRET and reads
information into workstation-local memory. If the
user then resets the session level to
UNCLASSIFIED, then it is possible that SECRET
information could be illicitly moved from the
workstation to the UNCLASSIFIED host. There
are two ways to prevent such Trojan Horse
attacks. First, the change in session level can force
the workstation to be purged of all stored
information or, second, the workstation must
enforce the mandatory security policy by
partitioning the information by security level. The
former does not permit the user to view
information at multiple security levels
simultaneously. This would severely limit the
usefulness of the workstation as a component in a
multilevel architecture. On the other hand, the
latter choice results in a requirement for a high
assurance multilevel secure workstation. The
likelihood that such a high assurance MLS
workstation would keep pace with rapid
commercial developments in the office
productivity arena is low. Thus users would find
such a solution unacceptable since it would bar
them from both the most up-to-date hardware and
rapidly evolving software products.
4.2. Static Workstation Security Level
Hinke suggested the notion of a high assurance
server to provide a locus of multilevel control to
single level clients [7].  In that design sketch
clients were relegated to a single level and were
connected to the multilevel server via single level
network links.
Although this architecture may be useful in certain
static situations, it does not provide the flexibility
inherent in that described in this paper. By
restricting the client to a single level throughout its
lifetime, users will be required to access multiple
clients in order to manipulate information at
several security levels. Thus, the problem we are
trying to solve, viz. multiple clients on a single
desktop, is not addressed.  Our requirement for a
choice of security level at the client forces us to
address several challenges. These include:
multilevel connections between clients and the
server, with the resulting requirement for
protection of network  communications; high
assurance, server-based identification and
authentication for client session level negotiation;
and provision of a trusted path between each client
and the server.
4.3. Chip-Level Filtering
The use of a chip-level filtering mechanism in a
PC to enforce aspects of security policy re-
introduces to the workstation many of the
challenges associated with the development of
high assurance policy enforcement mechanism. In
order for the filter to work effectively, information
within the PC must be labeled so that the filter can
process it appropriately. Anything less will result
in an approach to policy enforcement based on
heuristics.
4.4. Replication Architectures
Replication architectures [8] provide a simple
technique to achieve near-term multilevel security
by copying all information at low security levels to
all dominating levels. On a small scale one can
expect them to work rather well; on a large scale,
their usefulness is rather problematic. The
preponderance of information used in DoD today
is either unclassified or designated sensitive but
unclassified (SBU). Multilevel requirements have
always been to provide decision makers with
simultaneous access to information at all security
levels. In a replication architecture, this implies
massive amounts of replication. In the commercial
sector, the ratio of proprietary to less sensitive
information is similar.
5.  Continuing and Future Work
S veral interesting challenges lie before us in this
effor . They include:
§ Adaptation of a transport agent to the
multilevel secure environment.
§ Protection of data in transit between
workstations and servers.  Software techniques
will be used initially. Possible protection
mechanisms include cryptography using
PCMCIA-based cryptographic peripherals,
such as Fortezza cards, or other hardware
approaches.
§ Covert channel considerations in a distributed
environment and possible relationships to the
use of encryption.
§ Examination of evaluation and assurance
issues associated with the combination of
trusted components into a c herent network
architecture.
§ Design of a multilevel subject for encryption
of outgoing information .
§ D sign of a reliable communications subject
to execute on the high assurance platform. The
purpose of this subject will be to demultiplex
labeled requests for server content to single
level subjects at the level of the request.
§ Performance issues associated with multilevel
multiplexing at the trusted server.
5.1. Communications Services
There may be a need for external users to connect
to the server across a WAN. These users need to
be able to transmit protocols and data over a
network with trust throughout the transmission
path and, for accountability purposes, an adequate
level of audit as part of the transmission process.
Once the TCB has been extended from the mail
service to the workstation or network computer so
that a trusted path is available at each desktop, the
technical foundation to enforce a mandatory
security policy and the command/control over the
movement of data outside of the work unit will
have been established.  It will be possible to
provide a crypto-server to encrypt data using
cryptographic functions selected on the basis of
the data's security label. The system will provide
high assurance that the information is encrypted
using algorithms and keys commensurate with its
sensitivity. Thus, it will be possible to create an E-
mail server, for example a Defense Message
System (DMS) server that employs label-based
controls to select the cryptography to apply to
messages.
Although current hardware-based encryption
technology, with a processing throughput of less
than 1 Mbit/second, appears to be inadequate for
handling hundreds of workstations on a LAN,
future developments, projected to process 10
Mbyte/sec (80 Mbit/sec) will provide the
necessary through-put. Using a crypto-
concentrator on the server, these new
developments may be able to handle all of the
messages from the LAN. Several possible
cryptographic configurations are possible. For
example, the crypto concentrator could direct mail
messages to particular hardware encryption chips
based on the keys to be used for the message, or, if
the keysets are small and all hardware encryption
chips have the same keyset, the concentrator could
perform "load balancing" across what would
effectively be a crypto-multiprocessor. The use of
high speed, effective cryptography would
eliminate the need for a trusted LAN since
cryptography would be provided both at the
workstation and on the server. It is predicted that
this new generation of crypto-concentrators will be
available in the near term. With the recent
cancellation of work on Fortezza 2.0, which was to
provide Type I encryption for classified
information, careful analysis of available
government and commercial options will be
required as part of this investigation. In the
interim, current technology can be employed for
test purposes on LANs with a relatively small
number of Wintel work stations.
We believe that the use of a centralized TCB
server will provide sufficient performance to
support the message traffic for the initial prototype
LAN.  Future research may be required to the
determine how the mandatory TCB might be
distributed for performance enhancement. (Note
that the use of a multiprocessing TCB presents
significant performance advantages for the initial
sy tem by allowing the mail server and crypto-
server functions to be allocated to different
processors.) Among the future challenges would
be s curity administration in a highly distributed
architecture.
6.  Summary
We have described our preliminary design for a
COTS-based LAN providing high assurance
multilevel security for user information. Huge
investments in COTS software and user-built
applications based on commercial APIs can be
amortized within the context of our architecture.
No requirements for special source licenses are
required since no modification of COTS software
is required.
The capability to provide users with the ability to
use unmodified commercial PC operating systems
and office productivity software is a key aspect of
our architecture. This approach has several
benefits:
§ Exi ting commercial applications will be
immediately usable within the context of the
system
§ Users will be able to maintain applications
using standard upgrades and patches
§ Standard PC-based operating systems will be
used without modification
§ The use of diskless "Wintel" workstations
provides users with an attractive platform.
§ An evaluated COTS high assurance platform
simplifies the effort and builds on earlier DoD
investment in trusted systems.
§ A TCB-extension card eliminates the need for
multilevel secure workstations.
In summary, the marriage of high assurance COTS
products and current technology can create a
multilevel system insuring the security of
information while providing end users with the
continued use of their favorite COTS workstation
applications.
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